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Peremptory Challenges: Free

Strikes No More
by H. Patrick Furman

L

awyers exercise peremptory
challenges on the basis of an infinite number of hunches, gut
reactions, myths and stereotypes, as well as an occasional serious
study. Jurors are excused for reasons as
straightforward as their beliefs and
their jobs, and for reasons as esoteric as
the bumper stickers on their cars and
the magazines to which they subscribe.
Jury selection remains a delicate art,
not a science.
The question arises as to where the
race of a prospective juror fits into this
art. A recent poll of nearly 800 jurors revealed significant differences in the attitudes of black jurors and white jurors. 1
White jurors were far more likely than
black jurors to believe that blacks were
more apt to commit crimes than whites.
Black jurors were far more likely than
white jurors to believe that minority defendants get a less fair trial than white
defendants. Given these results and previous anecdotal support for these propositions, it is not surprising that criminal
lawyers have used race as a basis for exercising peremptory challenges.
In the past few years, the U.S. and Colorado Supreme Courts have addressed
the question of whether the exercise of
peremptory challenges on the basis of
the race of the prospective juror is constitutional. This article reviews the history of attacks on race-based peremptory challenges and discusses the procedures used to investigate and resolve
Column Ed.: H. Patrick Furman
of the University of Colorado
School of Law, Boulder-(303)
492-8126

such attacks. The article also contains a
brief discussion of other possible limits
on peremptory challenges.

In the 1986 case of Batson v. Kentucky, 4 the U.S. Supreme Court recognized this difficulty and significantly reduced the burden of proof on the defendant. The Batson Court held that a black
History of Peremptory
criminal defendant could establish
Challenges
a prima facie case of purposeful disHistorically, the exercise of peremptocrimination in selection of the petit jury challenges was not subjected to judiry solely on evidence concerning the
cial scrutiny or control. As stated by the
prosecutor's exercise of peremptory
U.S. Supreme Court:
5
challenges at the defendant's trial.
The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised The requirement that the defendant eswithout a reason stated, without in- tablish a systematic exclusion of minorbeing subject to the ity jurors over a series of trials was
quiry and without
2
dropped. The challenges made in a sincourt's control.
3
gle trial, as well as the comments and
Alabama,
v.
Swain
of
case
In the 1965
the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the questions of the prosecutor during voir
question of whether the use of peremp- dire and the challenging process, could,
tory challenges to strike prospective ju- under Batson, establish an improper morors on the basis of their race should be tivation.
Batson, like Swain, was based on the
subject to judicial scrutiny. The defenright
of a minority defendant to the equal
dant, who was black, contested the use
protection
of the law, the law being the
of peremptory challenges by the proseright to an impartial
Amendment
Sixth
cutor to exclude all the prospective jurors who were black. The Court held that jury. However, the Court gave a hint of
this action by the prosecutor did not vio- things to come by noting that the exclulate the defendant's right to the equal sion of a juror based on race deprives that
protection of the law because the defen- juror of the right to serve on a jury and
dant was entitled only to a jury which that such a denial may implicate the juwas impartial, not one which was repre- ror's right to the equal protection of the
law.
sentative of the community.
The Colorado Supreme Court adThe Court noted that a different issue
issue the next year in Fields
would be raised if the defendant could dressed the
6
this case, a black defendant
v.
People.
In
establish that there was an historical
challenging
the exclusion of Spanwas
pattern of prosecutorial discrimination
against jurors on the basis of race. The
Court intimated that proof of a systematic exclusion of minority jurors would
This newsletter is prepared by the
raise different equal protection issues
and might require a different result. Es- CriminalLaw Section of the Colorado
tablishing such a pattern required a Bar Association. This month's column
great deal of investigation and was ex- was written by column editor H. Patrick Furman.
tremely difficult.
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ish-surnamed jurors from the jury by
the prosecutor. 7 The Supreme Court
adopted the Sixth Amendment analysis
used by various state courts,8 rather
than the Batson analysis, and held that
race-based peremptory challenges by
the prosecutor implicated the defendant's right to an impartial jury under
both the Sixth Amendment and Article
II, § 16 of the Colorado Constitution. The
Fields court adopted the procedure set
forth in Batson for proving such a claim
and held that a defendant may establish
a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the selection of the jury solely on
the basis of the challenges made by the
prosecution in that trial. The defendant
in Fields, however, lost his appeal because the court found legitimate raceneutral reasons for challenging three of
the four minority jurors at issue.
The Colorado Supreme Court in Fields
suggested that the equal protection argument was available only to defendants
who were of the same class as the challenged jurors, although they did not decide this issue. The right to an impartial
jury based on a fair cross-section of the
community is available to all defendants,
regardless of race, and the concerns protected by that right outweighed, in the
court's opinion, the danger of imposing
limits on the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges.
Swain and Batson were based on the
principle that a defendant has an equal
protection right to an impartial jury and
that this right is infringed when prospective minority jurors are excluded from jury service in the trial of a minority defendant. The white defendant in Holland v.
Illinois9 attempted to reach the same result under a purely Sixth Amendment
analysis. The U.S. Supreme Court held
that there was no Sixth Amendment
right protecting a white defendant who
complained that the prosecutor was
striking blacks from the jury. However,
a majority of the Court indicated that any
defendant, regardless of race, would have
standing to raise a claim asserting the
excluded juror's equal protection right to
serve on a jury,10 and this approach was
soon adopted.

Current Analysis of
Discriminatory Challenges
In 1991, the focus of the decisions on
this issue shifted to the equal protection
right of every citizen to sit on a jury, regardless of race. This change in rationale, illustrated by Powers v. Ohio," had
significant repercussions.
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In Powers, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that a white defendant had standing to contest the discriminatory use of
a peremptory challenge on a black prospective juror. The Court held that the
defendant had third-party standing to
assert this claim on behalf of the juror
because the defendant and the juror
shared a common interest on the issue
and the juror was unlikely to ever assert
the right in a separate action. The Court
then held that the juror had an equal
protection right to participate equally in
civil life and that this right was impaired
if a juror was stricken from a jury on the
basis of race.

"In 1991, the focus shifted
to the equal protection right of
every citizen to sit on a jury,
regardless of race."

Once the Court adopted the conclusion
that the equal protection right ofjurors
was the right being protected, expansion of the right to contest racially motivated peremptory challenges was inevitable. The U.S. Supreme Court extended
the right to civil litigants 12 and, in Georgia v. McCollum, 3 to prosecutors alleging that peremptory challenges by defense counsel were racially motivated.
The McCollum decision recognized
that giving prosecutors the right to attack peremptory challenges by defense
counsel altered the balance of power in
the courtroom and invaded on the traditional view of a defendant's right to the
assistance of counsel. However, the Court
found that peremptory challenges by a
criminal defendant constituted state action under the Fourteenth Amendment
and that the exercise of this state action
was controlled by the equal protection
clause of that Amendment.

Procedure
It is now clear that the peremptory
challenges of both the prosecutor and
the defense lawyer are subject to an attack that they are motivated by racial
considerations. A number of recent cases, at both the state and federal level,
have addressed the procedural issues
which have inevitably arisen in connection with these attacks.
A party who believes that opposing
counsel is improperly exercising peremp-
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tory challenges on the basis of race has
the duty to raise the claim during the jury selection process. Counsel cannot wait
until after the jury is sworn to raise the
claim. 14 The party making this claim
has the burden of establishing a prima
facie case of racial discrimination. 5
The trial court must then decide whether a prima facie case of racially motivated challenges has been made out. The
Colorado Supreme Court has held that
a single peremptory challenge generally
does not establish discriminatory intent. 16 However, a single challenge which
results in no members of a cognizable racial minority remaining on the jury has
been held to establish a prima facie case
by the Colorado Court of Appeals.
Aprimafacie case may be based on the
questions and comments of counsel as
well as the actual strikes.I8 For example, support for a prima facie case has
been found in the fact that a prosecutor
asked a prospective African-American
juror if he knew anyone who had been
charged with robbery but asked prospective white jurors if they knew anyone who
had been the victim of a rob19
bery.
If the court finds that aprimafacie
case has been established, the burden
shifts to the party making the peremptory challenge to show that there are legitimate race-neutral explanations for
the peremptory challenges. 2° Finally,the
party contesting the peremptory challenges is entitled to respond to the raceneutral explanations offered by 2the attorney who made the challenges. 1
This same procedure applies when
the apparently discriminatory challenge
is made to keep a minority juror off the
jury by placing that juror in the alternate's seat. In People v. Portley,22 the trial judge used a variation on the traditional method of selecting the jury that
included assigning numbers to the
prospective jurors so that the attorneys
knew who the replacement juror would
be when they struck a juror. There was
only one African-American in the jury
panel, and the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge in such a fashion as to
place that juror in the second alternate
spot on the jury. The defendant argued
that this use of the peremptory challenge
violated Batson. The prosecutor argued
that the defendant had not even made
out a primafacie case of discrimination,
and the trial court agreed.
The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction. Even
though the African-American juror was
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crimination suit. He stated that he could
be fair and impartial and that his race
would not be a factor. The prosecutor
challenged him.
The defendant objected to the exclusion of this juror, and the prosecutor responded that he had two race-neutral
reasons: the evidence included racial
DNA Technology
slurs, and the defendant's father had
arrest
once claimed that the defendant's
Inheritance
was racially motivated. The court found
that the two reasons given here were
Race-Neutral Explanations
both race specific: both reasons
P Immigration
were based strictly upon the proseCounsel whose peremptory challenges
are contested must respond with a racecutor's subjective belief that [juror's]
o Single Parent
race would cause him not to be imparneutral explanation only if the trial court
tial in a case against a black defenfinds that a prima facie case of racial
dant.2
discrimination has been established.2
P Child Support
However, if counsel jumps the gun and Under these circumstances, the proseoffers explanations for the challenges cutor failed to rebut the defendant's priP-Expert Testimony
before the trial court makes the finding ma facie case, and the defendant was
that a primafacie case has been estab- granted a new trial.
Several federal circuit court decisions
lished, the Colorado appellate courts will
s- 20 Years Experience
consider counsel's explanations any- have addressed the issue of whether
way.24 The explanations offered by coun- counsel's explanations are race-neutral.
ANALYTICAL GENETIC
For example, in the Seventh Circuit, a
sel must be "clear and reasonably specif25
TESTING CENTER,INC
prosecutor who struck an African-Americ" and related to the particular case.
7806 Cherry Creek SouAh Dr. #201
By the very nature of a peremptory chal- ican juror in the trial of an African-AmerDenver, Colorado 80231
lenge, the explanations do not have to ican defendant justified his challenge by
Phone:(303)750-2023
rise to the level of a challenge for cause,2 claiming that the juror had not demonFax: (303)750-2171
but they must rise above counsel's as- strated an adequate understanding of the
sumption that the prospective juror is burden of proof and that he simply had
less able to serve because of race.2 7
A number of decisions address the
question of what constitutes a race-neutral justification for a peremptory challenge. The U.S. Supreme Court held that
it was legitimate for a prosecutor to strike
four Latino jurors on the grounds that
two of the jurors had relatives who had
been prosecuted by his office and that
he feared the other two Latinos, both of
whom spoke Spanish, would not be willing to rely solely on the official translation when listening to evidence presentFUNDS THE ARAPAHOE COUNTY
ed in Spanish. The Supreme Court refused to disturb the trial court's finding
COMPUTER-INTEGRATED COURTROOM?
of fact and noted that a racially disparate
result of peremptory challenges is not
OFFERS PRO BONO SERVICES?
enough: there must be a showing of discriminatory intent.
SPONSORS CONTINUING EDUCATION PROGRAMS?
In People v. Arrington,m the Colorado
Court of Appeals reversed the defenOVER 32 MEMBERS STATEWIDE?,"
SOF
C
dant's murder conviction after finding
that the "race-neutral" explanations offered by the prosecutor who struck the
sole remaining African-American juror
Committed and Involved Since 1918
were not, in fact, race neutral. There
were two African-Americans on the jury
panel. One was excused for cause. The
P.O. Box 127
(303) 686-5873
remaining African-American was quesWindsor, CO 80550
tioned extensively about race and discrimination, and it was learned that he
was the plaintiff in an employment dis-

neither challenged nor excluded, the net
effect of the prosecutor's action was to
minimize or eliminate the possibility that
the juror would deliberate. In fact, the
juror did not deliberate. The court concluded that the defendant had made out
a primafacie case and that the prosecutor should have been required to offer a
racially neutral explanation for the
challenge. The case was remanded for
this purpose.

PATERNITY
TESTING

Did you know that the
COLORADO COURT REPORTERS
ASSOCIATION
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a "feeling" about her that was not racebased. The court's review of the record
convinced it that the juror's answers to
questions about the burden of proof mirrored those of white jurors who were not
challenged. The court ordered a new trial.30
Similarly, a prosecutor who explained
that he struck a juror not because she
was black, but because she lived in a predominantly low-income black neighborhood and was therefore more likely to
believe that the police "pick on black people," was found to be making generic and
unsupported assumptions that people
who live "in an area heavily populated
by poor black people could not fairly try
a black defendant."31 Therefore, the court
ordered a new trial.
The use of a juror's nationality and
the attitudes the prosecutor associated
with that nationality were held to be an
inadequate explanation by the U.S.
Court of Military Appeals in United
States v. Greene.32 A black male soldier
was accused of sexually assaulting a
white female soldier, and the prosecutor
challenged a black, Panamanian-born
male juror. The prosecutor argued,
among other things, that a three-year
tour of duty in Panama had left him with
the belief that Panamanian men had different attitudes about sex and a male's
right to sex. The prosecutor believed that
such men had a "macho" attitude about
sex and were more likely than others to
believe a man had a "right"to sex. The
court found this to be a racial stereotype
without any support in the answers given during voir dire.
Finally, a prosecutor in the Ninth Circuit who struck the only Hispanic juror
and the only Hispanic alternate explained
his challenges by stating that they were
based on the age, residence, type of employment and appearance of those jurors. However, the record revealed that
a white juror with the same residence
was not struck and that there had not
been any discussion of age with the jurors. The court recognized that employment and appearance might constitute
legitimate race-neutral explanations of
a peremptory challenge. However, it reversed the conviction on the grounds that
at least two of the four proffered explanations appeared to be shams and there
was an inadequate record as to the remaining two proffered explanations.33

Remaining Procedural Details
There are several remaining issues
which should be addressed when deal-
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ing with the adequacy of counsel's explanations for peremptory challenges.

Mixed Explanations
The first issue is whether an attorney
who has offered both a race-neutral and
a race-based explanation for a peremptory challenge has met the burden of establishing a race-neutral explanation.
Batson held that peremptory strikes are
improper when based "solely on account
of [the juror's] race,"34 suggesting that a
strike based partially on race and partially on a legitimate reason might be
acceptable. Neither the U.S. nor Colorado Supreme Court has directly addressed this question. However, the Colorado Court of Appeals has held that
if even one explanation was insufficient, the [trial] court should have
ruled that the exclusion violated both
the defendant's and the prospective
juror's equal protection rights.5
Other courts that have addressed the
question have reached conflicting results. For example, the U.S. Court of Military Appeals has interpreted Batson to
require that "all the reasons proffered by
trial counsel be untainted by any inherently discriminatory motives,"3 6 while

the Eighth Circuit has held that one
valid explanation is all that is necessary
tojustify a peremptory strike, even when
the other explanations appear to be race37
based.

Adequate Findings
By Tial Court
A second point is that a trial court ruling on the question of whether counsel's
explanation for apparently racially motivated challenges is race-neutral must
make adequate findings to allow an appellate court to review the ruling. 38 A
simple finding that there has not been
any systematic exclusion of minority jurors is inadequate.9 Inadequate findings
by the trial court may result in an order
for a new trial from an appellate court if
it proves too difficult to reconstruct the
motives underlying the peremptory challenges. 4°
The fact that some minority jurors do
eventually end up sitting on the jury is
not dispositive of the question of whether counsel's peremptory challenges have
been improperly motivated by race. One
court has held that once a primafacie
case of racial discrimination has been
established, the fact that one or more
minority jurors remain on the jury is irrelevant. 4' However, it also has been

held that leaving minority jurors on the
jury, particularly when counsel has peremptory challenges remaining and does
not use them, is evidence
of a lack of dis42
criminatory intent.

The fact that a trial court believes that
the exclusion of minority jurors both
helps and hurts a litigant should not be
the basis for a ruling. Because it is the
equal protection right of the stricken juror that is being protected, the question
of whether the exclusion helps or hurts
a litigant is immaterial. 43

Limited Appellate Review
Finally, counsel should be aware that
appellate review will be limited. Trial
court rulings concerning jury selection
have traditionally been given deference,
and this same deference is given to trial
court rulings on the adequacy of counsel's explanations for peremptory challenges.44 Trial judges are in the best position to evaluate peremptory challenges
and the explanations for those challenges
because of their knowledge of local conditions and their ability to observe the
process. 45A trial court ruling on the adequacy of such an explanation will normally be reversed only if clearly erro46
neous.

Expansion of Batson
Challenges
Lawyers often exercise peremptory
challenges on the basis of the gender of
the prospective juror, although the question of whether a male or female juror is
better for any particular type of case remains the subject of much dispute. The
previously mentioned juror poll noted
some differences between male and female jurors. For example, both male and
female jurors felt that female jurors were
"more thoughtful" in reviewing the evidence and were "more ready to speak up
during deliberations."47 Although these
differences may not be as dramatic as
those found between black and white jurors, they are certainly worth consideration by anyone picking a jury.
The U.S. Supreme Court has not decided whether the Batson rationale
should be applied to peremptory challenges based on other attributes ofjurors. For example, while the Court has
held that gender discrimination in determining who is called for jury duty is
unconstitutional,4 it has not yet decided
whether peremptory challenges based
on the gender of the prospective juror violate the equal protection rights of that
juror or the defendant. The Court recent-
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ly granted certiorari in an Alabama case
raising this issue 49and should render a decision next ter.
However, at least one lower court has
extended the Batson analysis to peremptory strikes based on the gender of prospective jurors. In United States v. De-

Gross,50the prosecution complained that
the female defendant was striking male
jurors, and the defendant complained
that the prosecution was striking female jurors. The defendant struck seven
males, and the trial court found that this
amounted to a prima facie case of gender discrimination. The prosecution admitted that it struck a female to try and
achieve some gender balance on the jury.
In DeGross,the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the Batson analysis
applied to peremptory challenges based
on gender because they, like peremptory
challenges based on race, were predicated on the improper assumption that a particular group of people was either unqualified for jury service or could not be
fair. The court also noted that these
strikes excluded and therefore harmed
a distinct group of people, harmed community participation injury service and
undermined public confidence in the jury system, just as do challenges based
on race. The court went on to hold that
the challenges from both parties were
improper and ordered a new trial.
However, the Fifth Circuit and most
state courts which have considered whether to extend the Batson analysis to gender-based peremptory challenges have
refused to do so. In United States v. Hamilton,51 the defendant argued that the

prosecutor had challenged certain prospective jurors on the basis of race. The
prosecutor responded by explaining that
he had struck the jurors on the basis of
gender, not race. The Fourth Circuit expressly refused to extend the Batson
analysis to peremptory challenges based
on gender, noting that it did not "applaud" any peremptory challenge based
on a group classification, but read the
decision in Batson to apply only to
per52
emptory challenges based on race.

Conclusion
Peremptory challenges, which went
unregulated by the courts throughout
most of American legal history, are now
being subjected to scrutiny by the courts
to ensure that they are not being used
in a racially discriminatory fashion. The
already difficult task of selecting a jury
has been complicated by this development, and a whole new set of arguments
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and counter-arguments are now available to counsel injury selection.
Inquiry into racially discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges seems here
to stay, and this scrutiny may be extended to gender-based challenges as well.
The courts are unlikely to allow much
further expansion of the inquiry into
peremptory challenges but have not yet
set any precise limits. Trial attorneys
will undoubtedly continue to test these
limits as this area of law continues to
evolve.
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